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Introduction
A number of articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors pressure managers to achieve short-term profit goals at the expense of long-term equity value (e.g., Teitelman 1993; Coffee 1991; Jacobs 1991; Chote and Linger 1986; Drucker 1986; Dobrzynski, et al. 1986 ).
According to Porter (1992) , institutional investors are transient owners who are overly focused on short-term earnings. Fearing that a short-term profit disappointment will lead institutions to liquidate their holdings (leading to at least a temporary decline in equity value), managers are compelled to take actions that increase short-term profit. The most commonly cited action is cutting research and development expenditures. However, academic research has documented results at odds with this hypothesized behavior. Both Bushee (1998) and Wahal and McConnell (1997) find a positive relation between research and development and institutional ownership.
Further, institutional investors are often characterized as sophisticated investors who have advantages in acquiring and processing information compared to individual investors (e.g. , Hand 1990; Kim, et al. 1997; Bartov et al. 2000) . If institutional investors are sophisticated, they should be better able to utilize current period information to predict future earnings (compared to other investors) and current period stock prices should reflect more of the information in future period earnings as institutional ownership increases.
The purpose of our study is to provide evidence on the extent to which stock prices lead earnings conditional on institutional ownership. We find that the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. This result holds after controlling for various factors that affect the relation between stock prices and earnings (e.g., firm
size, market to book, and standard deviation of earnings). It also holds when we control for 2 endogeneity related to the possibility that institutional investors are attracted to firms in richer information environments where stock prices tend to lead earnings.
One piece of nonfinancial information that institutional owners may use to predict future earnings is the change in order backlog. A regression of the change in order backlog on stock returns, conditional on the percentage of institutional ownership, indicates that institutional owners place more weight on order backlog changes compared to other owners.
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This explains, in part, why prices lead earnings to a greater extent when there is a concentration of institutional owners.
Overall, our results are consistent with the view that institutional owners are sophisticated investors whose information acquisition and processing advantages are reflected in stock prices.
The results contradict the notion that institutional investors (compared to other investors) fixate on current earnings since current stock prices are more likely to reflect future earnings as institutional ownership increases. In addition to shedding light on the characterization of institutional investors, the results have implications for future studies investigating the relation between earnings surprises and stock returns. Controlling for institutional ownership may reduce measurement error in earnings surprise proxies since institutional owners are less likely to be surprised by future earnings realizations.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review related studies and develop our hypotheses. Section three outlines our research methodology while section four describes the data used in tests of competing views. Empirical findings are presented in section five and concluding comments are presented in the final section.
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Hypothesis development
Institutional owners as transient investors focused on current earnings
Institutional investors are often characterized as transient owners who are overly focused on current earnings. For example, Porter (1992) notes:
"Perhaps the most basic weakness in the American system is transient ownership in which institutional agents are drawn to current earnings, unwilling to invest in understanding the fundamental prospects of companies, and unable and unwilling to work with companies to build long-term earnings power."
According to Jacobs (1991) firms cannot hope to establish a viable dialogue with such transient investors over the future prospects of the corporation. Graves (1988) argues that fund managers cannot afford to take a long-term view in their investment decisions since they are reviewed and rewarded on the basis of quarterly, or at most, annual performance measures. Consistent with institutional transience, Potter (1992) and Kim, et al. (1997) report greater stock return volatility and trading volume surrounding earnings announcements of firms with higher institutional ownership.
Further, Lang and McNichols (1997) find that institutional trading is related to the market's reaction to earnings announcements. However, Eames (1997) finds only limited evidence of changes in institutional holdings after earnings announcements.
In a recent study, Bushee (1999) regresses institutional ownership on firm value components related to expected near-term earnings and expected long-term earnings. He finds that the mean coefficient on near-term earnings is positive and the mean coefficient on long-term earnings is negative consistent with institutional investors having preferences for value in near-term earnings compared to long-run value. However, the results are not statistically significant. For institutional investors classified as transient investors, Bushee reports convincing evidence of a preference for near-term earnings.
Institutional owners as sophisticated investors
Contrary to the view that institutional owners are transient investors, who are overly focused on the short-term, is the view that they are sophisticated investors with advantages in acquiring and processing information. This perspective is supported by a survey conducted by Shiller and Pound (1989) who find that institutional investors spend more time performing investment analysis. Lev (1988) argues that well-endowed investors have access to information that is too costly for others to acquire. And given that institutional investors, on average, have more resources than individual investors, they are likely to be better informed.
Walther (1997) finds that in regressing stock returns on unexpected earnings measures, the weight on analysts' forecasts of earnings increases and the weight on seasonal random-walk forecasts of earnings decreases with the percentage of stock held by institutional investors. Since analysts' forecasts are more accurate than seasonal random-walk forecasts, her result is consistent with the idea that institutional owners are more sophisticated than other owners. Further evidence on the sophistication of institutional owners is provided in a recent study conducted by Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) .
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They show that the pattern of observed post-earningsannouncement abnormal returns documented by Rendleman, Jones and Latane (1987) , Freeman and Tse (1989) , and Bernard and Thomas (1990) is reduced as the proportion of firm shares held by institutional investors increases. Thus, institutional owners are more sophisticated than other owners in that they are more likely to appreciate the time-series implications of a quarterly earnings innovation.
2 Our study was developed independently of the work by Bartov et al. (2000) .
Hypotheses
It is well known that stock prices lead earnings (Kothari and Sloan, 1992 HYPOTHESIS 2: The extent to which order backlog changes are reflected in stock prices is not related to the level of institutional ownership.
Research method
We adopt an approach suggested by Kothari and Sloan (1992) to assess the extent to which stock prices reflect a greater proportion of information in future versus current earnings for institutional investors.
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They note that stock prices impound information that will only later be reflected in accounting earnings and suggest an equation of the following form:
( 1) where R it,t-τ is the buy-and-hold return for firm i over the period t-τ to t, E it is income before extraordinary items for the accounting period ended at time t and P it-τ is the stock price at end of period t-τ. ω 1(τ) represents the market's response during the period t-τ to t to earnings information for the period ended at time t.
Because stock prices lead accounting earnings, as τ increases, it is more likely that the information contained in earnings at time t will be incorporated in the return over the period t-τ to t. This is because capital market participants likely impound information about current earnings in earlier time periods. To the extent that information contained in current accounting earnings has already been incorporated in stock prices of a previous period, the coefficient ω 1(τ) will get smaller (larger) as the time interval τ gets smaller (larger), i.e., ω 1(τ=2) > ω 1(τ=1) . Furthermore, the ratio of 7 ω 1(τ) obtained for a longer time interval to that obtained for a shorter time interval (ω 1(τ=2) / ω 1(τ=1) ) provides a measure of the extent to which information in current earnings has been impounded in prices in an earlier time period (see Figure 1) . A higher ratio indicates that more information in current earnings has already been incorporated in past stock prices.
To examine the influence of level of institutional ownership on the extent of information about future earnings impounded in earnings, we conduct two tests. First, we interact the earnings term with the level of institutional ownership and examine whether stock prices of firms with greater institutional ownership incorporate more information about future earnings. That is, we modify equation (1) as follows:
where INST represents the percentage of institutional ownership. Equation (2) is estimated for both τ =1 and τ =2 using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. By comparing ω 2(τ=2) and ω 2(τ=1) we examine the influence of institutional ownership on the extent to which information in future periods are incorporated in current stock prices. If current stock prices of firms with higher institutional ownership incorporate more information about future earnings then we should expect ω 2(τ=2) to be greater than ω 2 (τ=1) . 5 Next, we partition institutional ownership into quintiles and examine the ratio (ω 1(τ=2) / ω 1(τ=1) ) across the ownership quintiles. If institutional owners are sophisticated investors, then the stock price for firms with large institutional ownership should impound information in current earnings earlier than the stock prices of firms with small institutional ownership. Therefore, 8 we expect the ratio (ω 1(τ=2) / ω 1(τ=1) ) to be higher for firms with large institutional ownership compared to firms with small institutional ownership.
The tests suggested above assess whether institutional investors are sophisticated investors who incorporate information about future earnings in determining share prices. However, they do not directly test whether institutional investors incorporate forward looking information, that will be reflected in future earnings. To address this, we consider order backlog changes as a plausible piece of forward looking information. 6 We estimate the following equation to examine the extent to which stock prices incorporate order backlog information:
where ∆Backlog represents change in order backlog from period t-1 to t.
If the market impounds forward looking information such as backlog changes, we expect γ 2 to be positive. And if institutional owners are sophisticated investors in processing such forward looking information, then the stock price for firms with large institutional ownership are more likely to reflect the impact of backlog changes than firms with smaller institutional ownership. Thus we expect γ 3 to be positive. However, if institutional investors are myopically focused on short-term accounting earnings, then the likelihood of stock prices reflecting backlog changes (that are expected to be reflected in future earnings) should decline with higher institutional ownership.
Under that scenario, we expect γ 3 to be negative.
Data
To conduct the empirical tests outlined in the previous section we obtain data from two 9 sources. First, we gather ownership data from the Disclosure Database distributed by Disclosure Incorporated for the years 1989 to 1995. The database reports the percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutions and corporate owners. These ownership data are reproduced in the database from SEC filings 13-F, 13-D, 13-G, 14-D, and Forms 3 and 4. In a comparative study of the reliability of ownership data from several databases, Anderson and Lee (1996) conclude that the Disclosure Database ranks very favorably over peer databases. Next, we obtain financial data and stock price data from the 1995 COMPUSTAT annual tapes.
The final sample consists of 10,500 firm-year observations. The sample selection procedure, summarized in Table 1 , consists of three stages. We initially obtain an initial sample of institutional ownership data for 38,221 firm-years during the period 1989-95 from the Disclosure database. Of these, a number of firms-years are not found in the 1995 COMPUSTAT tapes reducing the sample to 18,014 firm-years. We eliminate 1,056 observations that are in the top and bottom 1% of the returns and earnings distributions. We also drop 6,458 firm-years for which data on analyst following are not available from the IBES tapes. This filter is necessary to control for the possibility that analyst following may be correlated with institutional ownership and the presence of analyst forecasts would facilitate the market's pricing of future earnings or backlog changes in current periods. The selection procedure yields 10,500 firm year observations for our empirical analysis. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in empirical tests. Of particular interest is the level of institutional ownership as measured by the percentage of their stockholdings relative to the total shares outstanding. The mean (median) percentage institutional ownership is 41% (40%). The distribution of percentage institutional ownership is comparable to that reported in prior research (e.g., Eames, 1997 , Bushee, 1998 . For the median firm, institutional owners collectively own four times as much equity as managers (40 % stake for institutions compared with 9% of managers). Hence, institutions are likely to have substantial incentives to invest in gathering information about the firms in which they invest. The mean and median total assets (unreported) are $3510 million and $317 million respectively, indicating a positively skewed distribution of firm size. The average income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value is 0.05. Among the cross-correlations examined (not reported), two correlation statistics are especially noteworthy. Firm size (SIZE), as measured by the logarithm of market value of equity, is highly associated with percentage institutional ownership and the correlation between the two variables is 0.54 (p < 0.01). Hence, any analysis that does not control for firm size will face a potentially large omitted-variable bias. Similarly, the strong negative correlation (-0.30, p < 0.01) between institutional ownership and managerial ownership highlights the importance of controlling for managerial ownership while examining the effects of institutional ownership.
Results
Analysis of the Extent of Future Earnings Reflected in Stock Prices
The results of estimating equation (2) using a pooled fixed-year effects model is reported in Table 3 . Recall that we need to estimate equation (2) for two time periods (τ = 1 and 2). To facilitate comparison of coefficients across time periods we estimate equation (2) for both time periods as a seemingly unrelated regression. Recognizing that several factors affect the relation between earnings and returns in addition to institutional ownership we control for such factors by interacting earnings with those variables in our empirical analyses. Specifically, we control for firm size, analyst following, market to book, lagged earnings, earnings variability, leverage and managerial ownership. We include firm size and number of analysts to proxy for the information environment while market to book proxies for growth opportunities. Lagged earnings is included to control for auto-correlation in earnings and earnings variability (measured by the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by lagged total assets) is included because studies of firm valuation have shown it to affect the earnings-return relation (e.g., Collins, et al. 1987; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989) . Leverage (total debt divided by market value of equity) and managerial ownership are included because they are related to accounting choices that affect the informativeness of earnings (Warfield, et al. 1995) . Table 3 presents results of estimating equation (2) with and without including the control variables. Note that the coefficient on earnings for stock returns estimated over the longer window (τ =2), i.e., ω 1(τ =2) is 2.75 while the coefficient estimated for the shorter window (τ =1), i.e., ω 1(τ=1) is 1.12. This is consistent with the notion that stock prices lead accounting earnings (Kothari and Sloan, 1992) . In other words, since the information in period t earnings is partially impounded in stock prices from period t-2 to t-1, the reaction to period t earnings will be greater for return window t-2 to t compared to return window t-1 to t. Our primary focus, however, is comparing coefficients, ω 2 (τ=2) and ω 2 (τ=1) , viz., the coefficients on the interaction of institutional ownership and earnings. Note that ω 2 (τ=1) is 0.81 whereas ω 2 (τ=2) is 3.81. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional owners are sophisticated investors since stock prices incorporate information earlier when institutional ownership is relatively high. If institutional owners were more focused on current earnings, compared to other investors, opposite results would obtain. Our inferences are unaltered when we control for the variables discussed earlier. In particular, the coefficient on the interaction term between institutional ownership and earnings increases when the stock return window increases (i.e., ω 2 (τ=2) = 3.69 > ω 2 (τ=1) = 0.83). The coefficient on the control variables are all statistically significant with the predicted sign with the exception of the number of analysts variable.
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In addition to the interaction analysis reported above, we focus on the ratio of coefficients for short and long intervals, not the coefficients themselves. That is, we test the prediction that the ratio of ω 1(τ=2) to ω 1(τ=1) increases across quintiles of institutional ownership. To conduct these tests, we modify equation (1) in the following way. We drop the earnings variable and the earningsinstitution interaction term from the regression. Instead, we allow the coefficient on earnings to vary as a function of the quintile membership of institutional ownership. As before, we account for control variables described above and estimate the regression across quintiles as a seemingly unrelated regression. Results of estimating the modified version of equation (1) across quintiles are reported in Table 4 . As expected, we find that the coefficient on earnings increases with the length of measurement interval in which returns are measured, i.e., ω 1(τ=2) > ω 1(τ=1) across all quintiles.
More importantly, we find that the ratio for institutional ownership quintile 5 (2.02) is higher than the ratio for quintile 1 (1.37). To evaluate the statistical significance of that ratio, we conduct a simulation analysis as in Jacobson and Aaker (1993) . Essentially, we generate 1,000 normal observations with the mean and variance characteristics reported in Table 4 for ω 1(τ=2) and ω 1(τ=1) .
Using these simulated observations of ω 1(τ=2) and ω 1(τ=1) , we obtain 1,000 ratios of the coefficients for the highest and lowest institutional ownership quintile. We find (results not reported) that the 13 mean ratio of the simulated coefficients for the high institutional ownership quintile is greater than the mean ratio of the simulated coefficients for the low institutional ownership quintile at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
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Analysis of order backlog changes
Next we estimate equation (3) to examine the relation between order backlog information and stock returns, conditional on institutional ownership. Table 5 presents results of estimating equation (3). The drop in sample size from 10,500 to 3,426 firm-years is due to the absence of order backlog information for the excluded firms. To maintain consistency with the equations (1) and (2), we augment equation (3) Tables 2 and 3 .
Endogeneity
One plausible explanation for obtaining the results documented above is that institutions seek to invest in firms with richer information environments. For example, Gompers and Metrick (1998) show that, on average, institutions prefer firms that are large and have high book-to-market 14 ratios. And, O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) report that institutional investors typically invest in firms that are widely followed by security analysts. One way to address such endogeneity is to include interactions of earnings with size (SIZE), market-to-book (MB), and analyst following (NANAL) in regressions (1) and (2). Note that the empirical specification reported in Tables 3 and 4 already include these interaction terms. Turning to the backlog regression, we introduced the interactions of backlog changes with SIZE, MB and NANAL to regression (3) and found that inferences from these revised specifications (untabulated) are similar to those already reported in Table 5 .
These sensitivity checks, however, do not address the possibility that institutions and returns may be simultaneously determined. To address that possibility, we conducted a two-stage least squares regression where equations (1) and (2) and (3) were simultaneously estimated in turn with a specification where institutional ownership (INST) was the dependent variable and the chosen instrumental variables were firm size, market-to-book, number of analysts, managerial ownership and leverage while stock returns (Rit,t-τ ) was the hypothesized endogenous variable. The tenor of our inferences remains unchanged from those reported in Tables 3, 4 , and 5.
Conclusion
In this paper, we test two competing views of institutional owners. One view is that institutional owners are overly focused on current financial performance. If this is the case, compared to other investors, institutions are less likely to consider future period earnings in pricing
securities. An opposing view is that institutional owners are sophisticated investors with better information processing capabilities and hence, stock prices of firms with higher institutional ownership will tend to reflect a relatively greater proportion of the information in future period earnings. We find results consistent with the latter view. Specifically, we find that for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership relatively more future earnings information is impounded in stock prices in comparison to firms with lower institutional ownership. Studies of firm valuation and contracting suggest a number of factors that need to be controlled when examining earningsreturn relations. Controlling for these factors, however, does not change the inferences with respect to institutional ownership in our study.
A regression of returns on changes in order backlog, conditional on institutional ownership, indicates that institutional investors place more weight on changes in order backlog compared to other investors. Since changes in order backlog are related to future earnings, this analysis provides additional support for the contention that institutional owners are sophisticated investors. Recent work by Bartov et al. (2000) which suggests that inefficient pricing of earnings is reduced when institutional ownership is high, also supports this view.
This is not to say however, that all institutional owners are sophisticated investors who are more likely to consider future earnings in pricing securities. Indeed, research by Bushee (1998) suggests that a sub-category of institutional investors (specifically those with high portfolio turnover, diversification and following a momentum trading strategy) may overly focus on current period earnings. However, our research contributes to the debate regarding institutional ownership by demonstrating that on average stock prices are more likely to reflect future earnings when institutional ownership is high which is consistent with institutional investors possessing information acquisition and information processing advantages.
Figure 1
Timeline underlying the research design related to hypothesis 1 R t,t-1 = stock return over the period t-1 to t E t = earnings for period ended at time t ω 1(τ=1) = proportion of earnings information at time t (E t ) impounded in stock prices during t-1 to t.
ω 1(τ=2) = proportion of earnings information at time t (E t ) impounded in stock prices during t-2 to t.
in stock prices during period (t-2,t-1) relative to (t-1,t). INST is the percent of equity shares held by institutional investors, MGR represents percentage of shares held by inside owners, i.e., individuals (officers, directors, and principal owners) who can exercise significant influence over corporate affairs, SIZE is natural logarithm of market value of equity, LEV indicates the ratio of total debt scaled by lagged total assets, EVAR is the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by lagged total assets, NANAL is the number of analysts following the firm, MB is the market to book ratio, E represents income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity and R is the annual stock return measure over the fiscal year. The sample is comprised of firm-year observations drawn from the 1989-1995 fiscal years. We do not report the coefficients on the intercept and the year-dummies for expositional convenience. t-statistics are in parenthesis. F-statistics relate to comparing coefficients under the two dependent variables. R t-1,t (R t-2,t ) is the stock return measured over the period t-1 (t-2) to t. See Table 2 for the definitions of other variables. The sample is comprised of firm-year observations drawn from the 1989-1995 fiscal years. 
27.66%
Quintile1 through Quintile5 assume a value of one to indicate membership to a particular quintile of institutional ownership and zero otherwise. R t-1,t (R t-2,t ) is the stock return measured over the period t-1 (t-2) to t. We do not report the coefficients on the intercept and year dummies for expositional convenience. t-statistics are in parenthesis. R t-1,t (R t-2,t ) is the stock return measured over the period t-1 (t-2) to t. See Table 2 for the definitions of other variables. The sample is comprised of firm-year observations drawn from the 1989-1995 fiscal years. We do not report the coefficients on the intercept and the year dummies for expositional convenience. t-statistics are in parenthesis. R t-1,t is the stock return measured over the period t-1 to t. ∆BACKLOG is the change in order backlog scaled by lagged market value of equity. R t-1,t (R t-2,t ) is the stock return measured over the period t-1 (t-2) to t. See Table 2 for the definitions of other variables. The sample is comprised of firm-year observations drawn from the 1989-1995 fiscal years.
